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By Reginald Herbold Green
I. The SNP Proposals
1. The 1981 Conference on Least Developed Countries identified agriculture - 
and especially domestic food production - as of central importance to 
achieving recovery and sustainable development in these countries and by 
the majorities of poor people and vulnerable groups within them. This 
priority is clearly reflected in The Substantial New Programme of Action 
adopted by the Conference at its Closing Session (A.CONF. 104/22, Part 
One, relevant paras in Annex to this paper).
2. Main points in the proposals included:
i. identification of agriculture - especially peasant agriculture - 
as critical in ldc's because of the high percentage of 
livelihoods, gross domestic production and (albeit not stressed 
in the proposals) export earnings derived from it;
ii. within agriculture (including livestock, fishery and forestry as 
well as crops narrowly defined) stressed the importance of 
domestic food production as a means to enhancing food security - 
especially for low import groups - reducing the commercial food 
import bill drain on export earnings and avoiding growing 
dependence on food aid;
iii. noted the poor performance - in absolute and per capita growth 
terms - of agriculture in the overwhelming majority of the ldc's 
in the 1970s and identifying reasons including inadequate 
knowledge, infrastructure, trained personnel, finance for 
improved production systems as well as exogenous forces 
including climatic disasters and negative terms of trade shifts;
iv. enhanced standards of nutrition and food security defined as 
"adequate food supplies... reliably accessible at prices that 
can be afforded by those who require them" especially for the 
most vulnerable groups were cited for priority attention;
v. leading to a target annual rate of growth of agricultural 
production of a year for the 19 8 0s;
vi. to be achieved by a series of knowledge, land use, production 
system, infrastructure and pricing improvements recommended in 
the 1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development (FA0-IL0) Programme of Action;
vii. organised in national food and agricultural and food strategies;
3. The need for enhanced external support for national agricultural and food 
strategies was stressed In respect to:
1. technical assistance;
11. financial assistance; 
ill. emergency food aid and
iv. self liquidating balance of payments support food aid.
4. Even in the light of post 1981 worsening of the external environment for, 
and increased knowledge about the food and agricultural sectors of, Idc's 
only a few comments, changes of emphasis or additions appear to be 
needed:
i. earned import capacity (the counterpart of export earnings) is a 
major constraint on many ldc's including on their food 
production sectors, therefore export restoration and expansion 
is a priority within many ldc agricultural sector strategies;
ii. many - in most ldc's a majority - of very poor households are 
rural sub-subsistence food producers, i.e. households producing 
basically for self provisioning but unable to produce enough to 
meet their own needs. For them food security enhancement needs 
to centre primarily on access to increased ability to produce 
their own food rather than on access to reliable supplies 
purchaseable at fair prices;
iii. especialy in SSA, it has become clear that relevant, tested 
knowledge on how production can be increased is far scarcer (and 
resource allocations toward producing it far higher and less 
cost efficient) than assumed in 1981;
iv. the overall ODA needs of ldc’s were underestimated (partly 
because the 4^ annual food growth output target was only 50% 
achieved), and actual net receipts overestimated, requiring 
reassessment of the size, role and duration of food aid as well 
as of the question whether it is inherently any more dependence 
creating or agricultural ouput deterring than other varieties of 
ODA.
The limited and ex post nature of these additions suggests that the 1971 
proposals have stood the test of time relatively well.
II. Other Strategic Proposals Since 1979
5. The major themes of international agency strategic proposals for food and 
agriculture since 1979 have by and large been consonant with those of the 
SNP albeit some have been much more articulated, more selective or had 
somewhat different balances of emphasis among means and targets.
6. The World Bank has stressed the need to concentrate resource allocation
to peasant production and, more recently, to increase actually tested 
knowledge based on improving traditional production systems. While it 
has placed much more stress on price incentives and agricultural exports 
(especially in the 19 8 1 Accelerated Development Report) it has also given 
emphasis to domestic food self sufficiency and to non-price measures 
(especially in the 1984 Sustained Development Report).
7. IFAD’s and WFP’s strategies and emphases have been very similar to those 
of the SNP. UNICEF’s have articulated the vulnerable group aspects of 
the SNP while the SNP itself draws heavily on the ILO/FAO World 
Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development.
8. FAO’s strategic proposals have tended to be more technical and production 
focused and to lay less emphasis on nutrition and vulnerable groups than 
those of the SNP, IFAD or WFP. More particularly FAO has tended to 
stress high technology import intensive systems more, and peasant 
production and improved traditional systems less,, than the SNP, the World 
Bank, the WFP or CGIAR.
9. The Coordination Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR) and 
the international crop research institutes (ICRI’s) it supports have 
since 1979 increased their emphasis on domestic food production, 
improvements relevant to poor and vulnerable rural households and ldc's 
(especially in SSA) - all shifts consistent with and articulating the SNP 
emphases.
10. Regional groupings primarily composed of ldc's - e.g. OAU, ECA, SADCC - 
have given increased attention to domestic food security, agricultural 
production and rural development since 1930 largely on along lines very 
similar to those in SNP.
III. Diversity Among LDC’s
11. LDC’s are by no means homogenous except in having had low levels of GDP
per capita, share of industry in GDP and literacy rates in 1970. All are 
weak economies but many contextual, structural, institutional, climatic,
external account, policy, size and ecological differences exist among
them. This is probably most true of their rural sectors.
12. Certainly a national agricultural or food strategy - and especially one
oriented to nutritional levels, food security and incomes of poor 
households and vulnerable groups - can only be drawn up nationally and 
primarily by nationals well acquainted with national and local contexts 
and specifities. To attempt a detailed master plan immediately
applicable to all ldc's with a few name and number changes would be an
exercise in folly or futility.
13. However, the weakness of agricultural and food production performance 
since 1970 is, in fact, a common characteristic. Over 1970-1980 only 6 
of 36 ldc's showed positive per capita growth rates of food production 
per capita. Of these 5 were under 1^  a year and - given the uncertainty 
of both food production and population growth estimates - within the 
margin of error of the available statistics. The sole exception was
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Malawi. Similarly while the performance record of the SSA ldc's was 
marginally poorer than that of the group as a whole their divergence from 
that of Asian ldc's over 1970-1980 was marginal: 1.955 annual agricultural 
growth and -0.555 annual increase in per capita food production in Asian 
and 1.456 and -0.855 for SSA ldc's respectively.
14. Therefore a common problem of low agricultural growth and deteriorating 
food balance does afflict virtually all ldc's. Further, many of the 
causal factors appear to apply to many ldc's as do many of the 
appropriate international support responses. As a result reviews of 
performance and of potential policy changes to improve it can be more 
than superficial even though in no case purporting to describe or to lay 
down specific combinations of causes or policies for any one ldc.
15. In this paper the terms agricultural, food production and crops are 
inclusive of relevant livestock, artisanal forestry and artisanal 
fishing. Primary emphasis is on small and medium scale peasant (or 
family farm) production both because it is dominant in most cases 
(especially in respect to food) and because it is particularly relevant 
to cost effective (especially import cost effective) output increases and 
to national food strategies oriented toward increasing nutrition and food 
security of poor households and vulnerable groups - in particular the 
majority of them who are themselves food producers. All overall or group 
ldc statistics, unless otherwise noted are abstracted or calculated from 
The Least Developed Countries 1984 Report.
IV. Performance 1980-1985
16. While in a majority of ldc's policy action has moved closer to the lines
proposed in the SNP performance has not approximated the 455 target. 
Projecting from 1980-83 data suggests 1980-85 averages of:
i. 256 to 2.555 a year in overall agricultural production;
ii. including 256 to 2.5% a year for both domestic food and domestic 
non-food/export sub-sectors;
i.i.i. -0.155 to —0 . 655 a year 'increases' in domestic food production 
per capita.
While slightly better than 1970-80 average performance of 1 . 555 (overall), 
1 . 955 (food), negligible (exports), -0 .755 (per capita food production) 
this record is by no means satisfactory. While - especially in 1982 and 
1984, the SSA record is worse than the overall ldc record, even for the 
non-African ldc's it is clear that the 455 agricultural production and the 
implicit 1 . 455 per capita food production targets have been missed by a 
substantial margin.
17. A related point is that overall net external resource flows to ldc's fell
from $7.1 billion in 1980 to $5.3 billion in 1983 or 3055 per capita even
in current price terms. While 1984 and 1985 may show modest per capita 
current price increases, these will be almost wholly the result of 
increased food aid (in real per capita as well as current price terms).
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Thus the SNP proposals and results need to be constrasted in full
recognition that overall and - with the exception of food aid - in
respect to agriculture there has been no SNP but an SRP (a Substantially
Reduced Programme) for Idc’s.
18. The causes of the disastrous overall agricultural and food production
results in ldc's during the first half of the 1980s are complex and 
probably vary more from country to country and within countries than do 
the results. Two clearcut contributory causes are the international 
economic setting and - especially in SSA - unfavourable climatic 
conditions. The first has created severe import constraints and 
generalised economic weakness from which agriculture has not been immune. 
The second has radically worsened production in particular years. When 
these two factors have been exacerbated by high levels of violence and 
disorder (civil war, externally organised wars or major overt aggression) 
the result has often been famine.
19. However, these factors have only exacerbated, not caused, the
unsatisfactory production trend. The lag of agricultural and food 
production growth behind that of population - especially in SSA - dates 
to the mid-1960s (e.g. World Bank Sustained Development Report) well
before the 1973-75 global economic shocks, the 1979-83 global recession 
or the most serious SSA drought cycles. The causes for this trend are 
still far from clear either in terms of importance or interaction for 
ldc’s as a group or individually.
20. Peasant real incomes - defined as real grower prices - have received 
major attention as a cause. In many cases they are a part and in some 
cases a major part of the cause but while they may have received too 
little attention in ldc’s in the 1960s, in the 1980s the danger is 
concentrating on them to the exclusion of other factors:
i. in respect to agricultural export production (which has hardly 
risen at all in ldc’s since 1970) falling real prices - largely 
the result of terms of global trade deterioration - relative to 
general domestic price indices, wages and food crop prices are a 
dominant explanation in many cases;
ii. but - not least in SSA - actual domestic food prices (on the 
increasingly dominant free or parallel markets used by 
producers, distributors and consumers) have risen faster than 
average domestic prices or wages in a majority of Idc’s 
especially since the late 1970s;
iii. further, food production for household self provisioning - 
especially by very poor households - has also risen less rapidly 
than peasant population, a result it is hard to relate to price 
movements;
iv. and - especially in SSA - overall price elasticities of 
production seem to be relatively low and, indeed, increasingly 
so given growing non-price constraints on, and reduced 
incentives for, production increases.
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21. In some Idc's resource allocations and policy attention to agriculture 
and supporting physical infrastructure are relatively low. However, in 
most cases these rose in the late 1970s and again in the 1980s so that 
this factor does little to explain the post 1965 negative trend - which 
is of course not to assert that better, more coherent strategy and more 
resource allocations are not necessary inputs into reversing it.
22. In most Idc's since 1979, and in many over a longer period, there have 
been marked deterioration in availability, quality and cost of rural 
transport, public and private sector procurement, availability of inputs, 
access to basic services (health, education, water) and access to 
incentive goods. Taken together these have a massive negative impact on 
output both as to the feasibility of increasing (or even sustaining) it 
and as to the incentive for doing so (or even staying in rural areas at 
all). However, this pattern is largely the result of negative external 
balance evolution and was not general until the late 1970s. Overcoming 
it is, therefore, a necessary condition but is unlikely by itself to 
reverse the underlying per capita trend rate of decline.
23. Cumulative increases in population (and in the proportion of basically 
food buying households) and cumulative environmental degradation (most 
dramatically, but not only, desertification) are a major causal factor. 
Since the mid-1960s population growth and the proportion of non-food 
producing households have increased dramatically. Thus higher absolute 
annual rates of growth of total food production (say 2.6 - 3.0Í in the 
1980s versus 1.5 - 2.Oí in the early 1960s) and of production per farming 
household (say 4 to 5i in the 1980s vs 2 to 2.5% in the early 1960s) 
would have been necessary to sustain per capita domestic food 
availability. Further, increased rural population has increased the 
number of households on low quality, sub-marginal or weather fluctuation 
vulnerable areas, reduced or wiped out traditional rotational (for herds 
as well as crops) patterns, led to ecologically unwise substitution of 
crops for livestock in drought prone areas and led to tree and bush 
cutting contributing to water table falls and erosion. In ldc's the 
basic cause of environmental degredation is poverty related need; greed 
by large farmers and plantations is usually secondary except in some 
cases in respect to forestry, fisheries and rain fed cropping of drought 
prone areas.
24. Population increase has led to environmental degredation and falling per 
capita food and overall agricultural production primarily because of lack 
of applicable knowledge as to how to increase output per peasant 
household and per hectare available to peasant households. This does not 
seem to result primarily from low allocations of finance or personnel to 
research and extension but to generalised cost inefficiency and strategic 
unclarity (a situation probably applying less to Bangladesh than to most 
other ldc's). With the exception of Bangladesh, availability of 
knowledge which is:
i. field tested for local ecological conditions;
ii. peasant user (not merely national economy) economic viability 
tested;
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iii. user compatibility (broadly defined to include existing 
production systems and organisation including gender divisions
of labour and of output) tested and
iv. risk reducing and significantly net output raising for peasant 
users
is very limited. This fact - which was quite unfashionable in the 1970s 
- is increasingly widely accepted by the World Bank (e.g Desertification 
In The Saheliand And Sudanian Zones Of West Africa, Report No. 5210, 
1985) and by independent agricultural researchers (e.g. M. Lipton, "The 
Place Of Agricultural Research In The Development Of Subsaharan Africa in 
SSA: Getting The Facts Straight, IDS (Sussex) Bulletin, July 1985).
Facing - and altering - it is probably the bottom line to achieving
sustained agricultural output increases of 4Í a year or more in ldc's.
However, because payoff will not be even or speedy, attack on other
causal factors as well as enhanced food aid better geared to developing 
food production as well as meeting immediate food needs are vital to
achieve short term gains until knowledge development, testing and 
dissemination can become much more effective than it now is in almost all 
ldc's.
25. Ways toward achieving improved food and agricultural production results 
in ldc's can be addressed under four heads:
i. food production;
ii. effective access to food;
iii. overall agricultural production and rural incomes;
iv. rural development and agricultural production; with special
attention to two further topics: food and/or export crop
production and food aid and food production development.
V. Food Production
26. Achieving increased food production is basic to any successful ldc food 
or rural income strategy. Without it no rural poverty eradication or 
urban fair price strategy can be effective for long, except with a large 
and buoyant non-agricultural export sector and/or large, secure and 
growing access to food aid - conditions which are neither general nor 
generaliseable for ldc's.
27. Within production peasant production is vital. In all but two ldc's 
peasants are a majority of the population and in all but five account for 
over half of food consumption. In most they produce the bulk of food and 
in a majority the bulk of locally and commercially marketed food. With 
post 1974 price ratios peasant production systems are - for most crops in 
most ldc's - both more cost and especially more import cost efficient 
than large scale, 'modern' systems.
28. Rural physical infrastructure - especially transport, storage and (in 
some ldc's) water control and distribution - requires urgent attention
first to rehabilitate what exists and second to expand with particular 
attention to peasant needs.
29. The deterioration of both public and private procurement systems (in
terms of cost efficiency and predictable accessibility to peasants) needs 
to be reversed - a process which may often be facilitated by multi
channel marketing but even more by enhanced access to fuel, spare parts 
and vehicles.
30. Research and extension requires reorganisation along the lines indicated 
in Para 24 above to increase its relevance to expanded peasant output. 
This may require more (and different resource inputs) to implement
redesigned policies and priorities but, it is structural change rather 
than overall input expansion which is the first priority in most ldc's.
31. As stressed in the SNP and by the WFP, national food strategies - backed
by articulated policies and resource allocations to carry them out - are 
critical to achieving sustained food production growth. This is
especially true given the overall scarcity of resources and the pressing 
need to reverse the radical 1980-85 deterioration in nominal (and even 
more real) per capita net external resource transfers to ldc's.
32. Food production response to other measures will be limited - on both
feasibility and incentive grounds - until accessibility, timeliness and 
effective prices of agricultural inputs and incentive goods are restored 
at least to levels approaching those of the late 1970's. In about half 
the ldc's this requires primarily enhanced maintenance and capacity 
utilisation of existing plant; in the others primarily increased imports. 
In both cases improved access may need to lead - not hog - food
production recovery and, therefore, to require productive capacity and 
production maintenance external assistance.
33* Raising, or at least limiting declines in, effective grower prices is
important, but peasant albeit ability to raise output (which also raises 
peasant incomes) is usually just as important. The problem is that in 
ldc's in the context of rapidly declining real per capita national 
command over resources, it is rarely practicable without substantial 
additional access to external grant or near grant finance.
34. Other policy measures - eg in respect to credit and to land reform - are 
critical in some, albeit not in all ldc's. However, the appropriate 
articulation varies so much from ldc to ldc that few generalisations can 
be made at policy level.
VI. Effective Access to Food
35. Production alone cannot generate effective access to food for poor people
or vulnerable groups. To achieve that they must either be able to
provision their own households, have adequate incomes to purchase 
sufficient quantities of food to meet their needs and/or have access to 
grant or subsidised food.
36. For the rural poor, enhanced access to food primarily means ability to
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produce more - especially but not only in SSA. This is particularly true 
for those rural households who are basically food producers but are 
unable to produce enough to meet household needs.
37. In addition enhanced access to other cash income - eg rural works
programmes finance by food aid counterpart funds - can both increase 
small peasant incomes (allowing them to build up their own farms and 
purchase inputs) and rehabilitate or improve rural infrasatructure and 
reverse environmental damage (eg by tree planting, erosion control).
38. For emergency and rehabilitation assistance, free food (or cash to buy
it) is a first step toward preserving access to food. It is, however, 
inadequate unless followed up by support for rehabilitating productive
capacity (eg seeds, implements, initial year inputs, basic herd and/or 
draught animals) to allow the affected peasant households to restore 
their own earned incomes. Logically an integral part of disaster relief 
both nationally and in emergency food aid, this rehabilitation priority 
is frequently overlooked or given inadequate resources by both.
39. The goal of ensuring effective rural access to food does not override the 
imperative to raise production. It does require evaluating who is to 
produce more, how and to whom and where supporting resources will be 
allocated on a basis more complex than minimum cost per unit of 
additional - or especially additional marketed - output.
40. Small peasant production and measures to increase it are by no means 
necessarily more costly per unit produced than large, modern production
units - in general in ldc's they are less so. But poor households will
often primarily eut their additional production limiting any cash flow to 
the state while sub-marginal areas' rehabilitation and improvement often 
does have a relatively low cash flow benefit/cost ratio. Development 
measured in terms of nutrition and raising the incomes and security of 
vulnerable groups is not identical to production unit profit or national 
investible surplus maximisation.
41. Rural poverty and nutrition issues cannot satisfactorily be tacked.on to 
a national strategy. They need to be integral to its formulation. Which
crops, produced by whom, where, how (in terms of production system), why
(as to household provision, local or commercial market) and with what
resource support are questions whose answers shape how the nutritional 
and income gains of additional food production will be shared.
42. Urban (and permanently landless rural worker) food security can be
assured only in the context of adequate food suplies. Neither private 
markets nor fair price shops can provide food at prices the poor can
afford in the context of severe shortages.
43. The most generally appropriate way to increase wage earner and informal 
sector household ability to buy food at any given price level is by
raising their productivity and their real incomes - a topic well beyond
the scope of a food and agriculture sector discussion.
44. However, especially during policy adjustment and/or rehabilitation
periods and for handicapped persons subsidies and related measures may be
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appropriate - again a plausible use of food aid counterpart funds. 
Indeed if real peasant incomes are to be raised before output recovery is 
achieved in most ldc’s the only way to do so is to secure external 
resources to subsidise either the rural or the urban poor until output 
recovers. Otherwise, attempted real - distribution is more likely to 
lead to enhanced inflation and disorder and lower urban productivity than 
to speedy structural adjustment.
VII. Overall Agricultural Output and Rural Incomes
45. The poor performance of ldc agricultural sectors has not been limited to 
food. In fact the worst performance is most ldc’s has been in respect to 
domestic non-food and export crop production. The basic problem is not 
an intra-sectoral shift away from food but a low overall sectoral growth 
rate.
46. The macro economic case for raising production of domestic industrial 
inputs and - in many cases - of selected export crops is very strong. 
Ldc’s in general need to reduce the overall import content of their 
production and to expand the overall proportion of output exported if 
they are to regain external balance compatible with sustained per capita 
GDP growth. The agricultural sector alone can achieve neither objective, 
but without increased domestic agricultural inputs into local market 
manufacturing, pre export processing, and direct exports neither can be 
achieved in most ldc’s.
47. The strategic requirement is for an integrated national agricultural - as 
well as or including a national food - plan backed by articulated 
programmes, policies and resource allocations. In the majority of ldc’s 
a necessary condition for recovery and sustainable structural adjustment 
is that both the domestic food and the non food/export sub-sectors of 
agriculture grow faster than population.
48. In fact, ecological suitability, peasant production systems and 
appropriate crop rotations or mixes data often point in the same 
direction. Many export crops are grown on land which is marginal or 
sub-marginal for food; weather insurance oriented crop mixes frequently 
include non-food items; a number of SSA traditionl production systems for 
major export crops, also include self provisioning or commercial staple 
food crop production.
49. The production growth issues in respect to overall agricultural 
production are broadly similar to those reviewed above (Paras 26-34) in­
respect of food. However, the need for special associated processing 
systems and intensive extension advice is more common with export and 
some domestic industrial import crops if they are to be produced 
efficiently by peasants.
50. Rural incomes can be raised more rapidly if an overall - not purely a 
domestic food centered - approach is taken to agricultural production. 
Income distribution issues are more complex. In most export crops in 
most ldc's, small, poor peasants produce a smaller share of export and 
non-food than of domestic food crops. Therefore, even more than with
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food, specific attention to improving their access to production should 
be built into export and non-food sub-sectoral strategies.
VIII. Rural Development and Agricultural Production
51. Certain rural development issues relate directly to agricultural and food 
production development. Among the most critical are non-agricultural 
incomes, basic services, rural technology, environmental degredation and 
population.
52. In many ldc's a significant proportion of peasant household cash income 
is from non-agricultural sources. Effective agricultural sector planning 
often requires taking this element in household economic systems into 
account. Especially in areas of high population/land productivity ratios 
improved nutrition and food security require steps to enable households 
to increase it. Further, such income is, under some circumstances, the 
chief source of household investment (e.g. tools, livestock, inputs, 
trees, wells) to increase production.
53» Basic services (health, education, drinking water) are critical to
present and future production. Ability to work effectively is dependent 
on health. Ability to understand and adapt new knowlege is increased by 
education. Reduced time requirements for collecting water and caring for 
sick children (or husbands) enable women to increase their agricultural 
production. Further, absence or deterioration of basic services is - 
especially in SSA - a major disincentive to remaining in rural areas. 
Therefore, rehabilitation and expansion of access to basic services 
should normally be seen as a necessary component of any strategy for 
achieving sustained increases in agricultural production.
54. Rural technology outside agriculture itself - in respect to processing, 
building, storage, water, fuel procurement and use, etc - is relevant to 
achieving higher crop production. First, associated technology saves 
time - in respect to processing, water, fuel and storage - especially the 
time of women who head a significant proportion of ldc peasant households 
and in most Idc's provide more than half of the person days devoted to 
agricultural production. Second, improved infrastructure can increase 
production, lower post harvest losses and reduce transport costs. These 
associated technology issues should be treated within a holistic approach 
to food and agriculture not, as is usually true today, treated as 
separate, minor topics.
55. Environmental degredation resulting from the need of poor peasant 
households to survive can be tackled only in the context of increasing 
productivity, poor household incomes and knowledge. Improved rotation 
and fallow systems, tree planting and protection, anti desertification 
measures, erosion control and herd limitation can be introduced and 
sustained only if peasant households can (literally) live with them, 
understand and maintain them and perceive them as increasing present and 
future household incomes. For that to be achieved requires study of 
actual peasant production and income systems and, usually, initial 
resource injections (e.g. via food or, wages for work on environment 
rehabilitation projects). Environment degredation protection and
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rehabilitation should be comprised within holistic national agricultural 
stragegies more often, more centrally and more operationally than appears 
to be the case today.
56. Historically, rural population growth has usually declined when infant
mortality and absolute poverty declined while education, access to food 
and household security improved. There is no evident reason to suppose 
ldc's are radically different. Therefore, agricultural and food 
production, food security and rural income distribution strategy and 
performance are for most ldc's among the most crucial components of 
population policy.
IX. Food and Industrial/Export Crop Production
57. Agricultural production in ldc's consists of five components:
i. household food production for self provisioning;
it. food production for local sale (usually in large part 
statistically lumped with i "subsistence1' because of data
collection problems);
iii. food production for domestic (urban plus food deficit rural area 
and household) commercial sale;
iv. non-food production for domestic sale;
v. non-food production for export sale.
58. Classification of production as subsistence and cash and equation of the
latter with export oriented production is conceptually unsatisfactory and 
practically misleading. First, few peasant households are wholly self 
provisioning oriented - almost all seek to achieve a cash increase 
income to make cash purchases. In most ldc's the bulk of commercialised 
agricultural production comes from small and middle peasant households 
who also produce their own basic food. Second, the poorest peasant 
households are in a real sense "sub-subsistence". Their agricultural 
production is oriented to household self provisioning but is not adequate 
to achieve it so that they are not purchases of food. Third, for a 
peasant household a cash crop is one that is sold whether it is food or
non-food, domestic or export market. For a majority of peasant
households the main cash crops are domestic food crops. Fourth, small 
and middle peasant (albeit not large peasant, commercial farm or 
plantation) systems are almost never mono-crop unless the sole crop is
both the household staple and the household source of cash income.
Household provisioning - with limited exceptions - is given pride of 
place by most peasant households even when they include substantial cash 
sale oriented elements in their land and time allocation systems.
59. The assertion that the growing food production lay (behind population) 
growth in ldc's since the middle 1960's relates to substitution of export 
for household provisioning and commercial food crop production is, as a 
general statement, simply untrue. In almost all ldc's food production
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since 1970 has risen less slowly than overall agricultural production and 
a fortiori than agricultural exports. For SSA in the 1970's the data are 
very striking: 1.4Í annual total agricultural output growth, negative
agricultural export growth, 1.8Í food production growth (derived for 
Accelerated Development, World Bank 1981). There have been micro shifts 
- particularly in the case of new plantations, from domestic food to 
export oriented production but overall the trend has been in the opposite 
direction. The problem is that overall agricultural production is 
growing too slowly; to assert that the problem is too rapid an increase 
in export production - especially in ldc’s - is to distort reality in a 
way impeding finding solutions.
60. The reasons for the shift are fairly clear. Domestic food can usually be 
sold in ways that bypass official marketing channels or private 
monopolies if these are incompetant and attempt to enforce low prices. 
Export and industrial crops cannot except by smuggling which is harder 
and not always practicable. In most ldc's food prices have risen more 
rapidly than the cost of living or wages. The combination of depressed 
world prices and frequently overvalued exchange rates has ensured that 
export (and often domestic non-food) crop prices have not risen equally 
rapidly. This reality is obscured in many cases by low official grower 
prices for domestic food as well as export crops. But whereas the latter 
(with substantial smuggling linked exceptions) may well be effective, the 
former are most unlikely to be effective if below market prices. Farmers 
can and do bypass official (or quasi monopoly large private) channels to 
sell both locally and to broader domestic markets if the latter pay 
better. This is not a marginal phenomenon. For example, in one ldc, 
peasant paddy production is of the order of 600,000 tonnes. Under 10% is 
sold to the "single channel" public corporate buyer; 90% is sold, 
transported up to 1,500 miles, milled and distributed via the parallel 
market. Despite the fact that the whole exercise is technically unlawful 
at each and every stage, the degree of prevention and even harassment is 
trivial. Readily available local market (and consumer price index data) 
price data indicate how great incentives to use the parallel market are 
and how misleading the idea of effective low prices to producers (or 
consumers) are.
61. In respect to research, extention and input provision a bias against 
peasant food crop production does, to a diminishing degree, exist -
especially in SSA. Within it drought resistant staples (especially 
millet, sorghum, cassava) have received particularly inadequate 
attention. As a result the bias is against sub-subsistence (household 
provisioning oriented but food deficit) households, those in sub-marginal 
and disaster prone areas and female headed households (three overlapping 
but not identical vulnerable groups). But again in SSA this is part of 
the more general problem already noted: area specific, economic
viability tested and user adopted applied agricultural research is
totally insufficient.
62. The primary goal must be raising overall agricultural performance.
Because of poor export prospects (which limit commercial food imports), 
the uncertain and lagged nature of food aid and the objective reality 
that the poorest rural households are predominantly food deficit, food 
producers, domestic food production must have priority within a balanced
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and context related agricultural and rural development strategy:
i. nationally earned import capacity (the counterpart of exports) 
is desparately needs to restore implement, fertiliser tool and 
other agricultural import availability as well as to restore 
rural transport, infrastructure and supply of incentive goods. 
In many ldc’s - especially in SSA - that requires restoring and 
raising, not cutting, export crop production;
ii. at household level, cash income is crucial. This is seen by 
most peasant households as a complement to, not a substitute
for, food self provisioning. To attempt to enforce food - 
versus non-food - cash crop production in such households when 
market signals or contexts dictate the reverse is likely to be 
ineffective, certain to entail costs and confusions and most 
unlikely either to increase rural incomes or focus attention on 
the most vulnerable and poorest households whose basic problem 
is producing more to eat themselves;
iii. on some land and in some years the appropriate crops - on 
household and national, market or shadow price calculations - 
include non-food crops. e.g. cotton and tobacco are less
drought susceptible than maize; sisal and cashew grow best in 
ecologies which are marginal or sub-marginal for food crops. 
Most peasant producers include food self provisioning and
intercropping in their production pattern - e.g. in East Africa 
bananas/plantains and coffee are symbiotic co-products in 
peasant (albeit not plantation) production as are cocoa and 
tubers in much of Forest Zone West Africa. Guarding against 
probable (especially probable bad) results and ensuring against 
disaster by a mix of crops (often also sound an overall output 
results) do in many cases lead peasants to choose
export/non-food as well as household provisioning and domestic 
food cash crops in their production mix. Especially in SSA 
second guessing peasant production system strategy has a 
disastrous record. Providing' more research, extension and input 
support for food crop production is desirable; trying to enforce 
or manipulate their substitution for export crop production is 
unlikely to have positive results.
6 3 . In summary:
i. the basic problem is inadequate overall agricultural production 
growth;
ii. substitution of export for domestic food crops is not the 
present general situation, indeed exactly the reverse is more 
common;
iii. both at national and household level export crops have an 
important role in a balanced agricultural sector and strategy 
for, economic, ecological and ’insurance' (against probable bad 
year results) reasons;
iv. however, more attention to research and extension keyed to
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domestic food crops and especially to those grown by 
sub-subsistence food producing/food deficit, female headed and 
sub-marginal at high risk area households is needed and would 
concentrate on 'inferior* or traditional staples including root 
crops and drought resistant grains;
v. although even in this case the problem is not so much either too 
much export crop oriented research absolutely or too little
resource allocation to food crop research but inadequate overall 
sectoral planning and actual local and peasant viability and 
applicability testing.
X. Food Aid: Integrating Survival and Development
64. Food aid has been on an upward trend - in 1984/85 the 10 million tonne 
basic target is thought to have been surpassed by over 20Í. In 1982/83 
9.2 million tonnes and in 1981/82 9.8 million tonnes were supplied - a 
much better performance against target than on the 0.7* of GNP ODA front. 
Similarly food aid literally to prevent starvation and food aid as
balance of payments support to loosen import strangulation have risen in
importance in the past decade especially in SSA where 1984/85 pledges
(largely to ldc's) are of the order of 5 million tonnes versus 2.3 
million in 1982/83 and under 1 million in the early 1970's. The ldc's 
are the dominant food aid recipients (again a contrast with financial 
aid). In brief food aid has been rising, near or above target, clearly 
relevant to a basic need, increasingly concentrated in ldc's. Why then 
has it aroused more criticism than financial aid and been seen as 
problematic in terms of impact on agricultural and on agricultural output 
growth?
65. The criticisms of food aid as a disincentive to raising food production 
fall into five major categories. It is said:
i. to lower prices and therefore reduce incentives to producers;
ii. to reduce government priority to developing agricultural and 
especially food production;
iii. to create a budgetary bias toward high food aid as opposed to 
domestic purchased supplies;
iv. to be a pure consumption transfer and therefore 
non-developmental and worse yet often a consumption transfer to 
above average increase urban residents;
v. to be inferior to other forms of aid especially when the food 
source is tied.
66. Each criticism may be valid in particular cases but the operative word is 
may. None is either universal or inevitable:
i. food aid may well lower food prices. As in most ldc's these are 
rising faster than average prices or wages, this is not self
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evidently socially or economically unsound. If food aid is sold
at prices at or above full cost unless given to starving or
destitute recipients the danger of rendering local food prices 
uneconomic is usually smaller. Emergency aid to the starving or 
virtually destitute has limited direct effect on prices - their 
effective market demand is negligible. It may well have a much
stronger positive effect on production by rendering them
physically and materially (e.g. not eating seed, selling all 
livestock and tools, abandoning homesteads) able to restore 
production after the emergency;
ii. certainly government attention to food production could be 
reduced were food aid large, certain, timely and growing 
predictably other than in response to major disasters. Most ldc 
governments do not perceive it as having these characteristics. 
In ldc's - albeit not more generally - there is a correllation 
between food aid and food imports. But in the first place this 
is precisely what we would expect in respect to emergency aid 
and in the second is quite as consistent with a major 
concentration on, and optimistic estimates for, domestic food 
production with food aid requests and receipts a residual to 
cover ex ante agricultural output shortfalls, as with a low 
priority to food production. In any case the overall terms and 
conditions of food - and associated rural development - ODA can 
reduce or reverse any such effect where it exists;
iii. the budgetary bias danger is real especially when food aid is 
sold at market or near market prices. In one East African Idc, 
the likely restoration of food self sufficiency in maize this 
year could, in principle, increase the recurrent budget deficit 
by up to $100 million or 30$. If food aid is tied to one 
product, annual and not linked to alternative balance of 
payments support finance this problem can be a very real one, 
albeit one more likely to increase government deficits and
inflation than to reduce food production;
iv. food aid is no more necessarily a pure consumption transfer than 
any other kind of ODA. In the cases of starving, destitute and 
low income (the typical ldc urban wage is probably effectively 
at or below $20 per month) recipients it is in any event unclear 
why consumption transfers from ODA giving countries are to be 
seen as self evidently unsound. More generally, emergency aid 
that preserves physical and material ability to produce and
balance of payments support linked to food *for work, 
agricultural import, rural infrastructure and incentive goods 
production can have more positive developmental import targeted 
on local production than most ODA. Inappropriate subsidies to
middle income consumers and urban oriented budget items are
possible but by no means inevitable or universal;
v. in general it may well be true that cash aid to buy food would 
be more efficient if it were available at least as promptly (in 
terms of food arrival) and at least in the same amounts as food 
aid. Unfortunately there is little to suggest that it would be.
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The question therefore is one of limiting diseconomies. Food 
aid is fungible - i.e. foreign exchange not spent on food 
imports can be reallocated. Multilateral food aid - e.g. WFP - 
can buy domestically (e.g. UNICEF where the problem addressed is 
regional and increase group focussed) and in other ldc's (e.g.
WFP in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya; and - before the 1 9 7 9 - 8 4 drought 
cycle - Tanzania for its Eastern and Southern Africa 
programmes). Food aid can be complemented by ODA linked to the 
import cost of related elements of food production development 
programmes.
67. Food aid is not homogenous. Three broad categories exist; emergency, 
balance of payments support and project. Prior to the explosive SSA 
related rise in emergency aid, these were about 30Í, 60^ and ‘\0% of food 
aid. Admittedly at the margin each shades into the other, e.g. food for 
work can be a vehicle for emergency aid; a developmental programme can be 
finananced from the counterpart funds from sale of balance of payments 
support food aid; a food aid financial project may be based on food for 
work plus personnel. However, in broad terms these three categories are 
useful in considering how food aid could be made more effective in 
furthering agricultural development.
68. To justify general reductions in emergency food aid - except in respect 
to improved food balance positions in Idc's - requires explaining 
convincingly to dying mothers and children why food aid is bad for them. 
To improve the effectiveness of emergency aid in terms of timeliness, 
flexibility, delivery capacity and distribution is important, widely 
discussed and primarily oriented to issues other than - though just as 
important as - raising the developmental impact of emergency food aid and 
will, therefore, not be discussed further here. To be effective in 
restoring food output promptly food aid needs to keep threatened rural 
households healthy and strong enough to work; preferably in areas they 
can use to grow crops or raise livestock, not in mass camps; to be timely 
enough to avert eating seed grain and distress sales of livestock, 
implements and land; and to be complemented by aid directed to restoring 
household and land productive capacity. Food for work programmes can 
serve all of these objectives (as well as weeding out non-poor 
recipients) if the needed inputs for resumed production are either 
purchaseable at bearable prices or provided in a complementary programme.
Domestic purchases can provide positive incentives for food production 
where the emergency is locality or low income household concentrated 
while neighbouring country procurement can encourage multi country food 
production and assist in supporting regional food self sufficiency 
strategies (e.g. that of SADCC).
6 9 . Balance of Payments support food aid can be (albeit in practice it may 
not be) highly positive in its rural development and food production 
impact. In much of SSA import strangulation has meant unavailability of 
agricultural inputs (including even hoes and cutlasses), deterioration of 
rural infrastructure, inadequate private and public capacity to procure 
related to fuel and transport shortages, massive deterioration of rural 
health, education and water services, general unavailability and sky high 
prices for incentive (i.e. basic consumer manufactured) goods. Any aid 
which is used to ease these constraints is conducive to enhanced rural
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welfare, development and food production. This Is true - even perhaps 
especially - If the Imported food Is sold and the proceeds used to
finance capital projects and basic services programmes and the saved 
foreign exchange reallocated to production and basic service operation 
and rehabilitation Import requirements.
70. More specific targeting of such food aid to rural development is
feasible. Food for work (including cash derived from food sales and paid 
for work by low income part time or seasonal rural employers) can be a 
key element in such a strategy. First, it can be used to rehabilitate 
build up rural productive and support infrastructure. Second, it can 
provide a workable device for selective support to the three largest very 
poor/very vulnerable groups - sub subsistence food producers who need to 
buy supplemental food, households in sub-marginal or vulnerable areas, 
female headed households. To do this requires a careful programme and 
employment design and extension but - as Indian and to a degree 
Zimbabwean experience shows - is possible. In addition allocation of 
counterpart funds to the domestic costs of rural productive and
infrastructural capacity rehabilitation and development to reduce future 
risks as well as the domestic costs of enhanced research, extension, and 
basic rural services can increase their direct impact on rural
development.
71. In respect both to emergency and balance of payments support food aid the 
developmental impact could be enhanced if broader multi-year food supply 
approach were taken:
i. when emergency food aid needs declined, other rural development 
oriented aid would be supplied automatically (a concept the EEC 
has begun to explore in its food strategy support arrangements);
ii. use of counterpart funds for the domestic costs of rural 
development (including infrastructure and basic services) could 
be encouraged and supported by supplying - on a pre-agreed basis 
- all or part of the complementary foreign exchange costs of the 
expanded programmes.
These two steps would inverse both budgetary and impact capacity 
predictability for ldc’s as well as providing positive incentives to 
raise resource allocations to enhance domestic food production.
72. Project food aid is the smallest and most criticised component. If 
closely targeted it often seems both to eat up a disproportionate input 
of scarce skilled personpower and to be contextually implausible (e.g. 
trying to solve child nutrition alone in the context of general poor 
household undernourishment). As the basic mode of food aid orientation 
to development in general and to domestic food production enhancement in 
particular, these criticisms are probably valid for most ldc’s. However, 
in the context of particular vulnerable groups and local problems some 
projects - e.g. of UNICEF and certain NGO's - do appear to be part of a 
cost efficient overall approach to using food aid to meet basic human 
needs and support food production expansion.
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73* In summary food aid:
i. is needed, available on an increasing volume, increasingly 
concentrated on Idc’s and potentially highly relevant to rural 
and domestic food production development;
ii. while it can be used in ways which have negative secondary 
impacts
on domestic food production, this is neither inevitable nor 
unique to food aid;
iii. the case therefore is for improved (and in the medium term 
expanded) food aid not its curtailment;
iv. emergency food aid’s first purpose is to avoid starvation and 
pauperisation. In doing so it can be oriented to preserving and 
restoring household and rural productive capacity;
v. balance of payments support food aid is potentially highly 
relevant to reducing both macro and micro constraints on and 
increasing incentives/capacity for domestic food production. 
The use of food for work/food sale financed rural work 
programmes and of counterpart funds complemented by related ODA 
financing can increase the degree to which that potential is 
achieved;
vi. project directed food aid can play a useful supporting role but 
is probably usually unsatisfactory as the major channel for 
substantial national programmes and is best developed via 
specialised (e.g. UNICEF) and voluntary agencies;
vii. both increased flexibility and multi-year food sector oriented 
approaches including both food and other ODA could substantially 
increase the effectiveness of food aid and reduce its potential 
negative side effects.
XI. Summary and Conclusions
74. The 1981 SNP identification of food and agriculture as an area critical 
to renewed growth and development of ldc’s, but as one characterized by 
poor performance was and is true. Its policy proposals and instruments 
have been broadly corroborated or amplified, not refuted, by subsequent 
analysis and experience. Its agricultural growth target of remains 
critical to achieving sustained rehabilitation and growth as well as food 
security.
75. However, over 1980-85 ldc food and agricultural sector growth rates have 
averaged under 2.556 and under population growth. Especially in SSA, the 
food security position has worsened dramatically. At the same time net 
external resource inflows per capita have declined substantially even in 
current price terms increasing both the need for and the difficulty in 
achieving accelerated food and agricultural growth rates.
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76. Agricultural performance has been affected by negative external economic 
developments and unfavourable weather. However, the underlying trend 
rate of growth has been below that of population for two decades so that 
these exogenous events have been crisis precipitating rather than trend 
causing. While price incentives have played a negative role (especially 
for export crops) they are by no means an adequate total explanation of 
the trend. In most ldc's serious real (production and or transport 
capacity), incentive (lack of desired goods), environmental degredation, 
population and lack of applicable knowledge (on how to raise output) have 
interacted to contribute to poor agricultural performance over 1970-1980 
and 1980-1985.
77. Action to reverse the past trend of falling per capita agricultural 
production requires holistic national food and agricultural strategies 
(with articulated programmes, policies and resource allocations to 
achieve them) in four areas:
i. food production
ii. overall agricultural production
iii. food security and in particular greater food production by poor 
rural households.
iv. rural development issues - including basic services,
non-agricultural income and technology, environmental protection 
and population - directly related to agricultural production.
78. In most Idc's the basic agricultural problem is that growth rates of
domestic food, non-food and export production are all too low. Indeed
that of domestic food is the least weak in a majority of ldc's. Macro
economic, rural income and technical agricultural reasons all suggest
that raising output in domestic food and in non-food/export sub-sectors 
should be seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing not as 
competitive or alternative.
79. Food aid is necessary for many ldc's for the foreseeable future. It is 
rising in volume, concentrated on ldc's and potentially more positively 
related to food production development - as well as to food security - 
than some other types of ODA. The strategic priority is to improve the 
contribution both emergency and balance of payments support make to 
increasing agricultural production. Several aspects are relevant:
i. relating emergency food aid to production.
ii. ensuring that balance of payments food aids' positive macro 
economic impact is used to strengthen rural infrastructure, 
agricultural input availability, rural basic services and 
availability to peasants of incentive goods;
iii. building up more effective food for work and programmes financed 
from food aid sale counterpart funds directly relevant to food 
production rehabilitation and expansion and, where necessary, to 
meeting part of the short term costs (eg to poor workers) of
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policy changes raising peasant incomes in advance of production 
increases;
iv. greater donor flexibility and holism including providing 
complementary ODA for the foreign exchange costs of agricultural 
rehabilitation and development programmes whose local costs are 
met from food aid proceeds and programming both food and 
non-food ODA in support of ldc national food and agricultural 
strategies on a multi-year basis to enhance both food activity 
and efficiency of strategy implementation.
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Annex: Food and Agriculture Sections of Substantial New Programme Of Action
For The 1980s For Least Developed Countries
I - A. Food and agriculture
9. Agriculture and fisheries feature among the essential social and 
economic priorities for the development of the least developed countries, 
both as a means of satisfying the most fundamental human needs and as a 
basis for economic growth. Although more than 80 per cent of the people 
in these countries depend on agriculture for their livelihood and on an 
average 50 per cent of gross domestic product originates in this sector, 
productivity in agriculture is extremely low because of several 
bottlenecks, including inappropriate, defective and inefficient 
techniques of production as well as very weak agricultural support 
institutions and lack of infrastructure and other agricultural inputs. 
In addition, in many of these countries agriculture is specially 
vulnerable because of the threat of desertification and because of very 
limited irrigation facilities as well as of the vagaries of nature. The 
performance of most of these countries in this sector during the last two 
decades has been characterized by negative growth of per capita food and 
agricultural output. Many have also experienced rapid population growth 
compounded by rural exodus, increased urbanization, chronic food 
insecurity, stagnant or deteriorating nutrition well below minimum 
standards, a stationary volume of agricultural exports with declining 
terms of trade, and rapidly rising imports of food and agricultural 
commodities, especially cereals.
1. Food Strategies
10. In view of the above situation it is necessary that the agricultural 
sector continue to receive the highest priority in the national 
development strategies of the least developed countries. In particular, 
one of the first objectives for these countries should be to increase 
their food production so as to improve the nutritional, situation of their 
populations, especially the most vulnerable groups, and diminish their 
dependence on external supplies. In this context, the World Food Council 
has emphasized the concept of a national food strategy in the context of 
national programmes in order to raise food issues to the highest policy 
levels and ensure a more co-ordinated approach to all aspects of food 
production and distribution, nutrition and national food security. 
Within the framework of their national development priorities and 
programmes, least developed countries should therefore prepare 
strategies, plans and policies for the agricultural sector, giving 
particular attention to food production and distribution, which will:
provide a framework for the identification and preparation of 
investment projects and help mobilize additional domestic 
investment resources and external financing and
- aim at attaining greater food self-sufficiency as soon as possible 
and thereby at eliminating hunger and malnutrition as rapidly as 
possible and at the latest by 1990.
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2. Food Security
11. Achievement of food security should clearly be one of the prime 
objectives in the agricultural sector. This requires that adequate food 
supplies be reliably accessible at prices that can be afforded by those 
who require them. To achieve the goal of food security in the least 
developed countries, programme and policy action at the national level is 
required, as well as the help of the international community, as is
emphasized in the Plan of Action on World Food Security endorsed by the
Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations.V
12. Every least developed country should take important initiatives to 
reduce its dependence on food imports, more particularly because of the 
changes they entail in food consumption patterns and the various 
dislocations they may lead to in the food sector of the developing
countries and the need to reduce foreign exchange outlays. In addition 
to the primary objectives of increasing agricultural production, 
initiatives should include efforts to expand and appropriately distribute 
local, national, subregional and regional food stocks, taking into 
consideration capacities and techniques at the local level; to train 
personnel in the management of these stocks; and to strengthen early
warning systems through improved information gathering and reporting on 
food crops and on stocks.
3. Food Production
13. The pre-condition for an improvement in food production is the 
demonstration of a strong political will (a) to direct adequately, and 
where necessary to increase budgetary resources to agriculture as well as 
to related activities such as livestock production, fishing and forestry;
(b) to institute policies, especially on prices, which inter alia, will 
provide incentives for production, achieve an appropriate balance between 
crops for domestic consumption and crops for export and encourage small 
farmers and co-operatives to increase productivity; (c) to set up 
effective mechanisms for the drawing-up and implementation of the 
necessary programmes. Major emphasis in the decade of the 1980s will be 
given to increasing substantially agricultural production, aiming at an 
annual rate of increase of 4 per cent or more.
14. In conformity with the Programme of Action adopted by the World 
Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (Rome, 12-20 July, 
1979),4/ the least developed countries will pay particular attention to 
the following:
3/ FAO Conference resolution 3/79. For the text of the Plan of Action 
see FAO Council resolution 1.75, annex.
4/ See Report of the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development. Rome, 12-20 July 1979 (WCARRD/REP); transmitted to the 
members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General
( A / 3 4 / 4 8 5 ) .
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(a) Expanding the acreage of cultivable land wherever possible;
(b) Seeking appropriate solutions to structural problems of land
tenure;
(c) The improvement of productivity through the conservation of soil, 
provision of irrigation and drainage, and the use of appropriate 
tools, fertilizers and improved varieties of seeds;
(d) The development of indigenous farming techniques and, to the
greatest extent possible, the reduction of dependence of the
rural sector on imported inputs;
(e) The strengthening of national research, including the
dissemination of research findings already available;
(f) Training of the necessary manpower at all levels;
(g) The development of physical infrastructure such as rural roads
and communications and storage facilities;
(h) The reduction of post-harvest losses;
(i) The improvement and strengthening of arrangements for rural
credit, agricultural input supply and marketing and extension 
services;
(j) The application of appropriate pricing policies to provide the
necessary incentives to production.
4. Forestry, fisheries and livestock
15. Forestry is by far the most important source of fuel and the 
principal source of construction material in the least developed 
countries. Forest products are also important as supplementary food and 
animal feed. Scarcity of funds and skilled manpower has hampered the 
development and rational utilization of forest potential in these 
countries. At the same time, there has been widespread depletion of 
forest resources with resulting damage to watersheds, increased frequency 
and intensity of flooding, drought, desertification and loss of soil 
fertility. It is therefore necessary that the plans and programmes give 
emphasis to forest resource management through replanting, and through 
up-grading of infrastructure, of extraction techniques and of skills of 
forestry sector personnel.
16. Fish resources, both inland and marine, have considerable potential 
in several least developed countries and their planned exploitation will 
augment domestic protein supply and export earnings. In the decade of 
the 1980s the least developed countries will undertake programmes to 
introduce modern fishing vessels and gear, to develop fish landing and 
storage facilities and upgrade fishing and marketing techniques, and to 
undertake comprehensive fish resource surveys.
17. Despite the vital role of livestock as the major source of animal 
protein, of draft power for agriculture, of income for the non-farm rural
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families and of export earnings, methods of stock management and animal 
slaughtering continue to be primitive in the least developed countries. 
Shortage of animal feed, water and pasture lands and recurrence of animal 
diseases have led to the depletion of stock in many of these countries. 
Therefore, efforts will be made during the 1980s to improve animal 
breeding, to develop modern dairy farms for milk and meat production, and 
to improve ranch management, including the introduction of high-yielding 
feed varieties and control of animal diseases.
5. Rural development
18. Given that the least developed countries are essentially rural 
societies in which the majority of the population lives in rural areas, 
it is clear that there cannot be real social and economic development in 
these countries unless the standard of living of the rural population 
improves. In the context, therefore, of the high priority to be given to 
comprehensive and integrated rural development, every effort must be made 
to encourage the active and organized participation of the populations 
concerned in determining and evaluating, as well as in implementing, 
agrarian reforms in the programme of rural development with a view to 
increasing their over-all involvement, ensuring a wider sharing of 
benefits, increasing employment opportunities and raising productivity, 
and enhancing social infrastructures in rural areas, which will help stem 
rural urban migration. The programmes and projects will cover the 
strengthening of rural institutions and upgrading of skills (as set out 
above), primary and vocational education and functional literacy, 
planning and implementation of local projects and promotion of rural 
industries and service centres. Taking due account of the need to 
preserve and maintain natural resources by respecting the ecological 
balance, they should also seek to promote a diversification of economic 
activities and to ensure that economic development is paralleled by the 
promotion of the necessary social infrastructure in the areas of primary 
health and sanitation, safe water supplies and adequate housing. Since 
these programmes and projects should as far as possible be labour and 
local-cost intensive, they will call for appropriate support in terms of 
the assistance needed from specialized experts and for flexible modes of 
financing.
19. Within the framework of a transformation of rural life in its 
economic, social, cultural, institutional and human aspects, policies are 
needed which recognize the role of women in rural development and ensure 
their equitable access to productive resources, especially land and water 
resources and to inputs, markets and services.
II D - 3. Food and agriculture
97. Food and agriculture is an area where there is an important role for 
international co-operation in support of domestic efforts. The least 
developed countries will be able to rely on the developed countries and 
the relevant international institutions to help them
- to draw up national food strategies, such as those mentioned in 
paragraph 10 above;
to take the steps laid down in that paragraph.
98. Increased technical and financial assistance should be provided to
raise agricultural productivity and expand the production and improve the
conservation of foodstuffs, particularly in the case of food crops. The 
least developed countries should be able to benefit more from aid for 
rural investment supplied by the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development.
99. The international community should be mobilized to participate in 
the establishment of food security in the least developed countries. To 
this end, the following measures should be taken:
(a) Financial and technical support for initiatives to be taken by
the least developed countries to build up national and 
subregional stocks;
(b) Early negotiation for the conclusion of a new international wheat 
agreement containing viable economic provisions;
(c) Actual establishment of the International Emergency Food Reserve 
at the level of 500,000 tons per annum, particularly through the 
participation of new donors;
(d) Other appropriate measures, designed to strengthen national food 
security and increase on a predictable basis investment in 
agriculture and rural development.
100. Food aid, which is a critical part of any national food strategy 
for some least developed countries, is likely to continue to be necessary 
in order to help meet food requirements which most of these countries are 
unable to satisfy by themselves. Adequate food aid in the form of 
emergency aid will have to be made available in order to help ensure the 
survival of populations threatend by famine. In accordance with the 
objective of self-sufficiency in food, food aid in the form of a 
contribution to the offsetting of structural deficits will have to 
continue to be temporary, so as not to exacerbate or perpetuate the 
dependence of deficit countries.
101. Countries not yet taking part in the international food aid effort 
- but which could do so - should make a significant contribution to 
attainment of the annual objective of 10 million tons of cereals as food 
aid to developing countries under the Food Aid Convention, 1980.
102. Food aid for least developed countries should be provided so far as 
possible in the form of grants or on highly concessional terms; donors 
should consider paying relevant transport costs.
